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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

DAVID C. STREETER,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 930206-CA
Priority No. 2
:

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Emphasis added.

Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel.
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall

any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Emphasis added.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE POLICE VIOLATED MR. STREETER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
IN THE
FIRST
INTERROGATION.
The

State's

argument

that

the

incriminating

statements made in the second interrogation are properly admissible
is

premised

on

a

series

of

faulty

premises

and

incorrect

interpretations of the law.

A.
The

"NO" IS NOT AMBIGUOUS.

State

erroneously

asserts

that

interrogation when defendant unequivocally

State's brief at Point I.A., pp. 14-20.

asked

he

"wished

to

speak

When the police

to us now without

present," David responded "No."

ceased

invoked his Miranda

rights."
if

"Police

an

attorney

This very first response was an

unequivocal invocation, and was not honored.
should have ended then and there.1

The interrogation

David had invoked his fifth

amendment rights to silence and counsel.

Continued interrogation

^ h e State's argument at p. 17 concerning the confusing nature
of the question, "Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak
to us without an attorney present?", is sophistry. Even a person
of David Streeter's tender years and somewhat below average
intelligence is able to understand this question.
2

was a fifth amendment violation, as well as a violation of article
I section 12 of the Utah Constitution.2

B,

UNDER UTAH LAW,3 AMBIGUOUS INVOCATIONS
MUST BE CLARIFIED, AND ARE NOT CLARIFIED
BY SUBSTANTIVE INTERROGATION.

Even if "No" were equivocal, Officer Cowley did not limit
further questions to clarification:
TC:

Well, I'll tell you right now that if
attitude with
us.

you

take

that

DS:

Well I ain't trying to

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we
know who has done what and who has done what to
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want
it
now.
Now do you understand
that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were

[.]
you with

tonight

[?]

2

The State further ignores the trial court's comments on this
point. During argument, the following transpired:
[by defense counsel]:
It's our position, your
honor, that during the initial interview conducted by
Detective Cowley, that upon -- when the defendant
indicated no, the very first time, that the interview
should have stopped at that point.
The court: There's no question about that.
R. 237:2-7.
The trial court correctly found that "No" was not
ambiguous, and rejected Officer Cowley's testimony that the
statement required clarification.
3

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129
L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), decided after Mr. Streeter's opening brief was
filed, has changed federal law in the context of ambiguous requests
for counsel made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda
rights.
Griffin, Sampson, and Gutierrez all have strong state
constitutional law underpinnings. Under article I, section 12,
these cases remain sound law in Utah and the new federal rule is of
no benefit to the State.
Regardless of whether Davis would otherwise control, the
State here did not obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver prior to
the allegedly equivocal "No" at issue here.
3

Transcript, p. 1 (emphasis added).

After an arguably equivocal

invocation of fifth amendment and article I section 12 rights,
further questioning must be limited to clarification.

State v.

Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sampson, 808
P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507

(1992); Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 901.

Officer Cowley, instead of

clarifying, resorted to threats and substantive interrogation.

C.

THE POLICE MISCONDUCT
INTERROGATION
WAS
A
VIOLATION.

IN THE FIRST
CONSTITUTIONAL

The State attempts to argue throughout its brief that any
violation which occurred during the first interrogation was only a
Miranda

violation,

violation.

rather

This is not so.

than

a

full-fledged

constitutional

Continued interrogation after only an

arguably equivocal invocation of article I, section 12 rights is a
constitutional violation.

State v. Gutierrez, 864 P. 2d 894, 902

(Utah App. 1993) . When the invocation is unequivocal, rather than
merely arguably equivocal, the constitutional violation is only
more patent.

See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-5 ("If, however,

he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning.").
The United States Supreme Court first delineated the
difference between Miranda violations and constitutional violations
in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182
4

(1974)

(allowing admission of testimony of third party witness

discovered through unwarned but voluntary confession).

Because

only a violation of Miranda's prophylactic rules occurred rather
than a constitutional violation, the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407,
9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) was held inapplicable.
The Miranda decision discusses both the new prophylactic
rules as well as the core constitutional protections.
whether police misconduct

The test of

is a mere Miranda violation

is not

whether it violates any of the language of the Miranda decision, as
the State seems to suggest, but rather whether it violates only the
prophylactic rules announced there.

One must look to whether a

core constitutional right was violated, on the one hand, or whether
instead the circumstances involve no coercion, the confession was
voluntary, and there was only a failure to give one or more of
Miranda's prophylactic warnings.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,

105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), cited by the State, is in
full accord with this proposition:
There
is a vast
difference
between
the
direct
consequences flowing from a coercion of a confession by
physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to
break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences
of disclosure of a 'guilty secret' freely given in
response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, as in
this case.
Elstad,

4 70 U.S. at 312

(holding that unwarned

but

voluntary

confession did not taint subsequent warned confession).
Where, as here, the full Miranda warnings are given,
there can be no mere Miranda violation.
5

The prophylactic warnings

have been given. Any subsequent violation is constitutional -- the
suspect's

privilege

respected,

and

against

the police

self-incrimination

have

attempted

to

has

not

coerce

been

(or have

successfully coerced) a confession.
Here,

the

police

misconduct

is

violation.

Full Miranda warnings were given.

rights

responding

by

uncounseled

"No"

to

interrogation.

Officer

Officer

a

David invoked his

Cowley's

Cowley

constitutional

request

violated

for

David's

constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by
continuing

the

interrogation.

When

David

responded

to

the

officer's insistence that the interrogation continue by stating "I
have the right to stop at any time though, " the officer threatened
him rather than confirm that he did in fact have that right.4
Independently

and

collectively,

these

actions

violated

Mr.

Streeter's constitutional rights.
In Sampson, 808 P. 2d at 1114-7, this Court addressed and
rejected the identical claim made by the State here.

Continued

interrogation after an invocation of rights is a constitutional
violation.

The Utah Supreme Court declined to address the State's

"Miranda violation only" contention and denied certiorari.

The

United States Supreme Court likewise declined to accept certiorari
on that issue.

This issue is settled, and the State's position

must be rejected.
4

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 ("The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.").
6

D.

THE POLICE MUST FIRST OBTAIN A VALID
WAIVER BEFORE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO
INTERROGATE.

The State relies on the proposition
interrogate

until

there

is

an

suspect's constitutional rights.
requirement of a valid waiver.

unequivocal

that police may

invocation

at 444.

the

The State ignores the initial

A suspect's waiver of rights must

be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
U.S.

of

Miranda, 384

"' [T] he defendant is given the benefit of every

reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'"

Sampson, 808 P.2d

at 1108 (quoting State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987),
cert, denied,
(1988)).
first

484 U.S.

1044, 108 S.Ct.

777, 98 L.Ed.2d

864

Here, there was never a valid waiver of rights in the

interrogation.

David

Streeter

immediately

invoked

his

rights, and the police immediately violated them.
For the same reason, the State's reliance on Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S.
is misplaced.

, 114 S.Ct 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)

The Supreme Court stated:

We therefore hold that, after
a knowing and
voluntarywaiver
of the Miranda rights,
law enforcement officers
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect
clearly requests an attorney.
129 L.Ed.2d at 373 (emphasis added).

Absent a prior waiver (not

present here), Davis is inapplicable.

Even were Davis applicable,

the State fails to address state constitutional law.5
5

Both Sampson

The State's avoidance of state constitutional issues, brief
at 9 n.7, is disingenuous.
Mr. Streeter briefed a state
constitutional issue. See Opening Brief at 31 ("Utah should adopt
a similar rule [requiring new Miranda warnings at subsequent
interrogations] under Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.").
7

and Gutierrez have state constitutional underpinnings, and are not
supplanted by Davis.
The State asserts that the police obtained a valid waiver
in

the

first

interrogation,

interrogation was thus proper.

and

subsequent

State's brief at 19-20.

substantive
The State

ignores the fact that " [u] nder Miranda and Edwards,[6] however, an
accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be
used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request
counsel."

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490,

for
,

83 L.Ed.2d 488, 491 (1984) (per curiam); accord Sampson, 808 P.2d
at 1111 ("The fact that defendant continued to answer questions was
not a sufficient indication that he was abandoning his right to
counsel.").

David's consent to answer some questions, obtained by

the State upon further illegal questioning, does not render the
questioning proper.

To the contrary, the fifth amendment

and

article I section 12 violations are ongoing and compounded by the
further questioning.

E.

THE STATE INCORRECTLY CHARACTERIZES THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS
AS
FACTUAL FINDINGS.

The State attempts to manipulate the standard of review
to

its

favor

by

characterizing

the

trial

court's

conclusion

concerning whether the first interrogation was properly terminated
as a "subsidiary factual finding," State's brief at 16.

6

"[T]he

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d
378 (1981).
8

trial

court's

defendant's

ultimate

Miranda

conclusions

rights, which

concerning

the

waiver

conclusions were based

of

upon

essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an
officer's]

colloquy

with

reviewable

under

correction-of-error

a

defendant,

present

questions

standard."

of

State

law
v.

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1103.
The State does the same with the trial court's conclusion
that David made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights in
the

second

interrogation.

State's brief

at 29.

This

is an

ultimate legal conclusion reviewed with no deference.

F.

THE STATE CITES NO AUTHORITY FOR THE
PROPOSITION THAT THE POLICE HAVE NO DUTY
TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO A PHONE.

The State is quick to characterize the precedents cited
by appellant as "weak," brief at 21, yet does not cite a single
case stating that the police do not have a duty to provide access
to a telephone.

This is an issue of first impression in Utah.

The

combination of Officer Cowley's threats together with the failure
to provide access to an attorney resulted in actual compulsion.7
The State implies that the police were too busy, and
"simply chose to continue processing and interviewing these people
rather than to drop their business and do defendant a favor by
calling his mother."

State's brief at 12. Certainly if the police

7

The State's contention that David does not assert that this
constituted compulsion, State's brief at 20, is incorrect.
The
State further tries to characterize David's claims as sixth
amendment claims. In fact, they stem from the fifth amendment.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-2; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
9

had time to interrogate Mr. Streeter, they could provide a phone
when

he

specifically

requested

it

in

the

course

of

the

interrogation.
Even if there is no duty to provide access to a phone in
the normal

case, this

is not

the normal

case.

The

first

interrogation involved a complete disregard of David's privilege
against self-incrimination and repeated threats.

David heard his

rights, immediately tried to invoke them, and was unsuccessful.
This left him with the impression that he could not invoke his
rights. In this context, his desire to contact an attorney is most
understandable

-- David wanted the assistance of someone who

(hopefully) would be able to exercise David's rights and prevent
further coerced and compelled interrogation.

This Court should

hold as a matter of state constitutional law under article I,
section 12 that any time the police have violated a suspect's fifth
amendment rights, and the suspect requests access to an attorney,
the police have an obligation to provide immediate access to a
telephone for that purpose.

POINT
11.
THE
SECOND
INTERROGATION
WAS
UNATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITIES, AND
INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE THEREIN MUST BE
SUPPRESSED AS A FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
The State's arguments that there was no illegality in the
first interrogation, as previously set forth, is not well taken.
The State's argument that the second interrogation is not tainted
by the first interrogation likewise falls with its argument that
the initial police conduct was permissible.
10

In determining the validity of a confession or
incriminating statements following police illegality, two
inquiries must be made. First, the court must determine
"voluntariness," i.e., whether the confession was
voluntary;
second,
the
court
must
determine
"attenuation," i.e., whether the confession was obtained
in the course of police exploitation of the prior
illegality or, in other words, whether the voluntary
confession was sufficiently attenuated from the prior
police misconduct to remove any taint. The confession
must meet both tests to be admissible.
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (footnote cites to
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d
416 (1975) , et al,

omitted) .

Brown sets forth factors to be considered in analyzing
the exploitation issue: (1) the presence of Miranda warnings; (2)
temporal

proximity;

(3) presence

or

absence

of

intervening

circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.

Id. at 603-4.

See also Allen, 839 P.2d at 300-01,

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-1 n.4 (Utah 1990) (recognizing
Brown factors in search consent context), State v. Thurman, 846
P. 2d 1256, 1263

(Utah 1993)

(directing courts to apply Brown

factors in search consent context).
A.

Applying

THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS IN THE
SECOND
INTERROGATION
WERE
OBTAINED
THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR POLICE
ILLEGALITY.
the Brown

factors here, the

incriminating

statements were obtained by direct exploitation.
1•

No new Miranda warnings were given.

The first set of Miranda warnings preceded the police
illegality.

No new Miranda warnings were given.

The police only

addressed the right to counsel in the second interrogation. After
11

the failure of the police to honor David's invocation of rights in
the first interrogation, full Miranda warnings should have been
given in the second.

The State fails to cite a single case where

the police violated a suspect's rights, and a court held that
additional complete Miranda warnings were not required. The cases
cited by the State deal with circumstances where there has been no
police illegality, and the defendant has already waived his rights
on one or more previous occasions.
Mr. Streeter's initial Miranda warning is not effective
at the subsequent interrogation because the police refused to honor
his rights in the first interrogation, and the State obtained no
waiver.

The State asks this court to set a dangerous precedent --

police would be free to ignore a defendant's rights, convince the
defendant through conduct that he has no rights, and then obtain
"valid" waivers and confessions without a new recitation of rights.
This

Court

should

decline

to

make

such

a

mockery

of

the

prophylactic protections announced in Miranda.
2.
Only

an

hour

The
second
interrogation
proximal to the first.
or

two

had

passed

interrogation, and David was held incommunicado
and family.
prisoners

in

from

was
the

first

from his attorney

The State's assertion that the presence of other
the

holding

cells

something other than incommunicado,

makes

David's

incarceration

brief at 11, is not well taken.

These individuals were not in a position to accurately advise David
as to his rights, or assist in ensuring that they were respected
and honored by the police. To the contrary, the only way others in
12

the holding cell could have affected David's case is as snitches
testifying on behalf of the State.
3.
The

State

There
were
circumstances.
tries

to

argue

no
that

intervening
Officer

Cowley's

termination of the first interrogation, after David's fourth
invocation of his rights, is somehow an intervening circumstance.
State's brief at 25.

That the police ultimately ceased further

violations of David's rights does not in any way constitute an
intervening

circumstance;

instead,

it

was

a

bare

minimum

constitutional requirement. A recognition of the police illegality
and a formal apology, coupled with access to a phone, might stand
on different footing.

However, even 4M years later, the State

still has refused to admit any illegality, much less apologize for
it.

Full Miranda warnings, coupled with either consultation with

counsel or arraignment before a magistrate, would likely purge the
taint.

Here, there were no intervening circumstances, and the

taint has not been purged.
4.

The purpose of the illegality was to
obtain a confession, and the conduct
was flagrant.

Finally, the purpose of the illegality was ably stated by
Detective Cowley:
now."

"So I want the truth out of you and I want it

Transcript at 2.

The State even admits the purpose was to

"encourage him to tell the truth."

State's brief at 25. When the

suspect has expressed that he is not interested in discussing the
matter with the police without an attorney, such "encouragement"
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(properly read: coercion and compulsion) is a flagrant8 fifth
amendment violation.
coercive

police

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-4 (discussing

tactics,

including

"display[ing]

an

air

of

confidence in the suspect's guilt", id. at 450, conceding the right
to silence but maintaining questioning, id. at 453-4, and pleas for
the truth, id. at 454).

B.

THE POLICE DID NOT OBTAIN A VALID WAIVER
OF RIGHTS AT THE SECOND INTERROGATION.

Case law uniformly requires that a suspect be advised of
his or her rights at the time of interrogation. E.g. , Miranda, 384
U.S. at 469 ("whatever the background of the person interrogated,
a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable").
"[T]his warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.

No

amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been
aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead."

Id. at

471-2.
The State here attempts to use David's prior receipt of
Miranda warnings to show his awareness of his rights, despite the
police officer's failure to respect his repeated invocations of his
rights.

This is impermissible.

In State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351

(Utah App. 1993), a category I correctional officer was charged
with

lewdness

8

involving

Mr. Streeter
"conduct cannot by
flagrant." State's
all. The flagrancy
of the facts here.

a child.

This Court

addressed

the

nominally agrees with the State that the
any stretch of the imagination be termed
brief at 25. Imagination is not necessary at
is obvious and apparent on a bare examination
14

contention that this officer suspect did not have to be read his
full Miranda rights where the record establishes his knowledge of
his rights as a result of his status as an officer:
[W] e reject the State's contention that defendant's
assumed knowledge of his rights can be used as a basis
for neglecting to give him the requisite Miranda warnings
to which every other United States citizen is entitled.
This court refuses to engage in the kind of arbitrary
line drawing that would necessarily result if we were to
accept the State's argument,
Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358.
The State again approaches this Court seeking arbitrary
line drawing -- where a suspect has once been read his rights, his
repeated invocations have been ignored, and the police later desire
to interrogate again, the State seeks a rule whereby a complete
second recitation of the Miranda warnings is not required.

This

Court should again decline to engage in such fine line drawing.
Certainly, following any police misconduct a complete re-reading of
the Miranda warnings should be a bare minimum requirement.9
Detective Cowley failed to ask a very important question
at the second interrogation -- whether David's desire to speak was
motivated in any way by the threats Cowley had made at the first
interrogation.

The

prior

misconduct

9

in

this

case

makes

it

The State asserts that Mr. Streeter has waived this claim.
State's brief at 28. The State ignores counsel's argument to the
trial court:
[by defense counsel]
. . . and that any subsequent
interview must have a reMirandizing portion followed by
a knowing and intelligent waiver.
R. 239:15-17.
[by defense counsel]
It is incumbent upon them to
reMirandize and to make sure that any waiver there is a
knowing and intelligent waiver.
R. 253:4-7.
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distinguishable from the cases relied on by the State.

Elstad

involved an unwarned, voluntary, non-coercive confession followed
by a properly warned written confession that was introduced at
trial.

Here, we have the converse:

a properly warned but coercive

and non-voluntary first interrogation, followed by an improperly
warned second interrogation.

To the extent Elstad is applicable at

all to this case, it supports David Streeter's position.

It

provides:
When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that
passes between confessions, the change in the place of
interrogations, and the change of identity of the
interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has
carried over into the second confession. See Westover v.
United States, decided together with Miranda v. Arizona
[ ].
The failure of police to administer Miranda
warnings does not mean that the statements received have
actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has
not been intelligently exercised. New York v. Ouarles,
467 U.S. [649,] 654 and n.5, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d
550 [(1984)]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Of the courts that have considered
whether a properly warned confession must be suppressed
because it was preceded by an unwarned but clearly
voluntary admission, the majority have explicitly or
implicitly recognized that Westover's requirement of a
break in the stream of events is inapposite. In these
circumstances, a careful and thorough administration of
Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that
rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.
The
warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter
the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to
remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an "act of
free will." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S., at 486,
83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11 (footnote cites omitted).
Westover v. United States, was a companion case decided
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694

(1966) .

See

id. , 470

U.S.
16

at

494-497.

Westover

was

interrogated the night of his arrest by a local police agency, and
the following morning, all without warnings. At noon, FBI agents
took

over

the

interrogation,

gave warnings, and

confession two or so hours later.

obtained

a

The Supreme Court held the

warnings given by the FBI were insufficient to remove the prior
taint.

"In

these

circumstances

an

intelligent

constitutional rights cannot be assumed."

waiver

470 U.S. at 496.

of
A

break in the chain of events is required.
State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah App. 1994), cited
by the State at 29, is easily distinguishable.
police

had

obtained

In Hilfiker, the

a valid waiver of rights

at the first

interrogation. When Hilfiker exercised his rights, that invocation
was scrupulously honored by the police.

Hilfiker initiated the

second interrogation, and the officer confirmed that Hilfiker was
giving up the right to counsel he had previously asserted.

Here,

there was no valid prior waiver, the police engaged in misconduct,
and obtained only a partial waiver at the second interrogation.
Hilfiker is inapplicable here.
This case is closest to Westover.

In both, there was

coercive interrogation. While Westover was not warned in his first
interrogation, David fared even worse.

He was warned, but the

police refused to honor his invocation of rights.

David received

a clear message that the warnings were meaningless, and he had no
rights.

Westover received complete Miranda warnings when the FBI

took over the interrogation.
Westover's actions

Despite the complete warnings, and

in responding to further questioning, the
17

Supreme Court could not find a proper waiver. Here, David Streeter
did not

even receive

interrogation.

His

complete warnings prior to the second
purported

waiver

of

unrespected

contained in a distant memory cannot survive scrutiny.
circumstances, David

Streeter's

"waiver" was not

rights

Under the
knowing

or

voluntary.
Westover sets forth some of the factors to be considered,
including

(1) whether a different authority conducts the second

interrogation, (2) the location has changed, (3) significant time
has passed, (4) the suspect has been read his rights, and (5) the
suspect has been given an opportunity to exercise them. Here, the
same officer who previously threatened David and refused to honor
his rights also conducted the second interrogation.

While some

time had passed, this consideration is tempered by the fact that
David was not allowed access to his attorney or his mother. David
was not read his rights; rather the State relied on incorporation
of his prior (unrespected) reading of rights.

Absent a complete

reading of rights, David had a reduced ability to assert them. As
in Westover, no waiver can be found under these circumstances.
As in Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358, imposing a requirement
that police re-Mirandize suspects at the beginning of each discreet
interrogation poses no hardship on law enforcement personnel. This
clear-cut rule promotes consistency in the law, and fully apprises
officers of what is expected.

Certainly any time the police

violate a suspect's rights, Miranda warnings should be required at
all subsequent interrogations.
18

Even had Mr. Streeter received full Miranda warnings at
the second interrogation, that would not end the inquiry:
The nature and degree of the illegality will usually be
inversely related to the effectiveness of time and
intervening events to dissipate the presumed taint.
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and
the consent to find the consent valid. For example,
Justice Powell in Brown suggested that, where it
appears

from the facts that the police purposely engaged in the
conduct
to
induce
a confession,
an
intervening
consultation
with counsel or presentation
before
a
magistrate
may be required before the taint
can be
removed.
422 U.S.
J., concurring).

at 611,

95 S.Ct at 2265-66 (Powell,

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (emphasis added) . Here the taint of the
officer's refusal to honor David's rights and the threats made, for
the admitted purpose of obtaining the truth right then and there,
could only be dissipated by full Miranda warnings and either
consultation with counsel or arraignment before a magistrate. The
incomplete warnings were insufficient to break the chain of events
and dissipate the taint of the prior police misconduct.

CONCLUSION
David Streeter respectfully requests that the order of
the trial court denying his motion to suppress be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^ l

day of April, 1995.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
~~
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Transcript of September 22, 1990 Interrogations

O.K. I'm Detective
what it your name?

Cowley with

the police

department and

David
David what?
David Streeter
Spell you last name for me.
Streeter
What is your date of birth?
09-14-72
And you address?
3551 South 7200 West
Your home phone number?
250-9546
Have you been advised of your rights?
Yes
Ifm going to.do it again.
You have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lawyer
and. have, him
present with you while you
are being
questioned. " * if "you cannot *af f 6rd~a* hire a* lawyer, • one - vill
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you
wish.
You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights
and not answer any questions or make any statements, po you
understand these rights that I have explained to you?
Yes
Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now
without an attorney present?
No
You don't want to talk to us?
I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing
was sleeping over at my friends lawn last night and the cops
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and
Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you,
would you be willing to answer those questions without a
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Interview with David Streeter
lawyer present.
DS:

Maybe some of them.
know why I am here.

It

just depends cause I really don't

TC:

So does that mean we can ask you
answer the ones you want to answer?

DSz

Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, Ifll tell you right now that if you take that attitude
with us.

DS:

Well I ainft trying to

TC:

Because we have all the vitnesses we need and we know who
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the
truth out of you and I want it now.
Now do you understand
that?

questions and

you will

Yes
Who were you with tonight
J.D.
Who else?
Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here,
do is call my mom and he vill be down here.
You want your attorney?
Yes
And you don't want to talk to us?
Yes
O.K.

all you have to
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Interview with David Streeter
TC:

Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And after being advised of
wanted to talk to a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Nov is it your desire and you come
you want to talk to me now?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Go ahead*

DS:

Just tell the story.

TC:

Tell the story.

DS:

O.K. we was just coming home from that party...

TC:

Now hold on, you say "we" who is "we".

DS:

It was me and Bart in the car

TC:

Now does Bart go by Kevin.

DS:

Yes

TC:

And who's car is that?

DS:

Bart's car, and some guy, he had his brights
and that guy in front of us.

TC:

Which direction were you going?

DS:

West

TC:

So you were going West on?

DS:

On 41, so then he pulled over and let us go ahead of him and*
then he pulled behind us and turned his brights on.
So we pulled over and let him go in front of us and we
pulled down the street and then he started to get out of his

your rights you

said that

you

forth voluntarily that

In his car

on, Bart did,
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car and so ve jumped out of our
and I smacked the window.

car and he got back in his

TC:

With vhat?

OS:

My hand, and then (inaud)

TC:

You don't knov vho they vere?

DS:

Mo

TC:

Did you ever kick the car?

DS:

No, I didn't kick the car*
And then he drove away and then
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by 41 and ve got
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he vas at the 7-11 and he
started saying shit to us so ve pulled over vent back and
walked up to him.

TC:

So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the
car, then he left- Then you left right after him?

DS:

No, about 5 minutes.

TC:

So, on your vay to your house you sav.

DS:

Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11.

TC:

You sav the station vagon at the 7-11?

DS:

Yes, and they started yelling shit at us.

TC:

Which 7-11 vere you at?

DS:

The one on 4100 and 6400.

TC:

So you drove by and you sav the car there?

DS:

And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over and
walked up there.

TC:

Where did you pull over at?

DS:

Just on 4100.

TC:

So you didn't pull into the 7-11 parking lot?

DS:

And he had a hammer and he said "Nov I can kick your guys
ass91, something to that effect. So he vas coming at us and
so I picked a rock up and threw it at him.
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TC:

Hov big was the rock?

DS:

Just a little bigger than a golf ball.

BS:
OS:

Biggej^that^a^golf_baJJ^ajid^
Yes; a lot smaller than a
baseball*

TC:

So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from?

OS:

Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed it.

TC:

And then you threw it and hit him in the head.

DS:

I guess, it nix: nun--in-*cne-«^nead/ I don't know. A L U
/a^
really.qoinq to: do was scare^him; try to .get him to-back-.ua
vi th—the~- hammer.

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

cL^qtiess _he-_hi t^Barfc: wi thi:tha t- hammer::*

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then*.-the-girl-jumped "oBLae-.

TC:

What did they do?

DS:

Wrestled; me;^to_the_ground,^and^then^I__goti.upland-*- t-crotr * thaiguy of f. 3art~ and._I..said.Jflet_rs get. out- of -here " .

TC:

Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at
him and hit him.

DS:

Iijaight~have- kicked^himr

TC:

Where?

soft

ball,

smaller

than

DS:

/In*" the: chest^ ( inaud)

TC:

Was he laying on the ground when you did that?

DS:

He was on top of Bart-*

TC:

Did you do a n y t h i n g

DS:

No

TC:

You didn't hit him in the head and chest and you didn't grab
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock.

else.

a
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OS:

Oh, tfcihitr hincvhexuLLthrey^tha.t.rocJcthe^f i r s t^.t.ime^

TC:

But you d i d n ' t h i t him with a rock a f t e r t h a t ?

OS:

No

TC:

But you didn't hit him in the head.

OS:

No, (inaud)

TC:

Did you hit him with anything else?

OS:

No

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

We took off and vent back to my house and sat there and
everybody- vas"- leaving^ and— Dustixu and- Ron-iand Herd:—L they^vas.
l^jvingi^and^Lriguessl they-Vent^ito_the^:.7^rli^to^ get_ gast- I
don't know.
We vas all getting ready for bed and the next
thing you know Nelcd-vasl knocking;: atl-the^.. door-;

TC:

Who is Nerd?

DS:

Nerd is Cody.

DS:

And he says
Dustin^.

TC:

Dovn vhere?

DS:

The 7-11.

TC:

Which one?

DS:

3500 and 7200.

TC:

Go ahead.

DS:

So ve -ran dovn there*....

TC:

Nov you say "ve"/ vho is "ve"?

DS:

Me and J.D. and Nerd vas vith as.

TC:

So Cody.

DS:

And that is all that vas in the house.

TC:

What about Kevin?

"some

guy started

a

fight dovn

there

vith
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OS:

0h y e s , Bart t o o .

TC:

So you guys vent down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out?

OS:

res

TC:

Then what happened?

OS:

There were tvc guys chasing him around the parking lot*

TC:

Chasing Oustin?

OS:

Yes and I don f t know where Ron was* Ron wasn't helping him.
And the one run uo to Bart; Oustin was backing up and..Bart,
walked up by him and one grabbed Bart and.•thr^v him a o a ? n ^
,the car and Ouscm came from around the side of hinandv
nunched him and dropped him.

TC:

With one punch?

OS:

Yes

TC:

And he fell down on the ground and this
lot of 7-11.

OS:

Yes

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then-- the^.other»?one* had*^*Jay~ by~the-*- hair*»-and.- so^-*- we- ran-- upt
there? and got hia~off~and~ve~justre*t"ook*"rbff .-

TC:

Who kicked this guy on the ground?

OS:

I kicked him once.

TC:

Where?

OS:

In the head.

TC:

Did you see anyone else kick him?

OS:

No

TC;

So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground
you kicked him in the head?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you didn't see anyone else kick him?

was in the parking
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OS:

I was getting out of there, all I did vas vent and got that
guy off Jay and ve book off runnina b a d to mv iousa-.

TC:

Who is "ve"?

OS:

<Me and: Jay and Bart> Bart vas probably already at my house*
I just told them to get out of there•

TC:

Who had the gun?

OS:

Jay had a BB

TC:

When did he get that?

OS:

Probably after ve vent back to the house, I didn f t even knov
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops.

TC:

So you vent back to your house and did you guys come back to
the 7-11 again after J.D. got the gun?

OS:

No, the Jeep came up: by my house from the parking lot vith. a*
crovbax and vas going to kill Dustin.

TC:

From vhat parking lot?

OS:

Ream's, so_ve^.all ran. over^there and

TC:

So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Oustin?

DS:

Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve.~ couldr.heaar.vas
Oustin saying "he's aot a.crovbar" or something*

PC:

And that's vhen J.D. had the gun.

DS:

Yes, cause vhen I got
gun.

CC:

Who's gun does that belong to?

DS:

It vas JayJs-

TC:

Where is the gun nov?

DS:

I have-no idea.

TC:

You don't knov vhat happened to it?

DS:

No, I vas getting out of there.
vith it.

quit.

over there that is vhen J.D.

had the

I didn't vant nothing to-do
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TC:

What did you see J.O. do with the gun, did you see him point
it at anybody?

DS:

He just: had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody.

TC:

Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody?

DS:

No, it wasn't loaded (inaud)

TC:

Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what
happened?

DS:

That guy left
house*

TC:

So you didn't go back down by the 7-11 to check on this
other guy. So you don't know what happened to him? But geaccc
kicked him once in the^heac while he was 9x1 the. ground?.

DS:

Her was on his i/ay iovxi.

TC:

Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him
how about Kevin?

DS:

The only time I sav Bart was vhen that guy had him up
against the car and Dust in smacked that guy and he was on
his was down and _I kicked him and that is the last time I
seen Kevin, (inaud)

TC:

Going back to the first incident at the 7-11
how many times- did you hit and kick that guy?

DS:

i kicked him one .time and 1 don't: even- think I hit him.

TC:

Xou didn't hit hin yith your fist?

and then we

left and ve

vent over to

Jay's

on the ground,

on 6400 West

DS: Xo
TC:

So you only
head?

hit him once

vith a rock

DS:

I guess so

TC:

And then you Jcicked him in the head?

DS:

No

TC:

Where did you kick him?

DS:

Across the sL^JIdL^-'

and that was

in the
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TC:

Across the shoulder, vas he
kicked him?

OS:

He vas on too of Bart.

TC:

What did you see Bart do to him?

DS:

(inaud)
quick.

TC:

What did they do?

OS:

Just vrestled me down.

TC:

What did you do to the girls?

DS:

Just pushed them avay and told them to back off.

TC:

You didn't hit them vith your fist or kick them?

DS:

No, I vouldn't hit a girl.

TC:

You didn't hit them vith a rock*

DS:

No, that ladv came after me vith a hammer.

TC:

Did vou hit her vith a rock?

DS:

No

TC:

Did you throw a rock at her?

DS:

No

TC:

You are sure?

DS:

I'm positive.

I didn't

have a

laying on the

chance, them

ground vhen you

girls jumped

on my

